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 Over the last five years, the 
field of economics has undergone 
a reconsideration of its role in 
society. With the exception of a 
select few (Rajan, 2005), most 
economists were blindsided by the 
housing crash in 2007 and 
subsequent financial meltdown. In 
2003, Nobel Laureate Robert 
Lucas claimed that the “central 
problem of depression prevention 
has been solved,” echoing Irving 
Fisher’s pronouncement that 
“stock prices have reached what 
looks like a permanently high 
plateau” in October 1929. Even 
though the recent recession was 
not nearly as bad as the Great 
Depression, it was a sharp blow to 
the field of macroeconomics. Far 
from the arrogance that had 
characterized the field during the 
previous two decades, economist 
Paul Krugman tackled the 
question “How Did Economists 
Get It So Wrong?” during late 
2009 in a New York Times 
Magazine story. 
This undertaking has 
included a rethinking of the 
undergraduate economics 
curriculum, led by Wendy Carlin at 
University College 
London and Diane Coyle of 
Enlightenment Economics. 
Additionally, students have begun 
to take important roles in the 
debate. In April, the student-run 
Post-Crash Economics Society 
(PCES) at the University of 
Manchester published a report 
titled Economics, Education and 
Unlearning, which provided a 
critique of economics education in 
the UK and at Manchester in 
particular. However, as the report 
points out, “the problems … are 
certainly not limited to Manchester 
and are in fact international in 
scale” (PCES, 13). 
The PCES report is 
undoubtedly timely and makes a 
host of excellent 
recommendations. In particular, it 
is clear that a more cohesive 
economics curriculum should 
include study of the ethics, history, 
philosophy and politics of 
economics in conjunction with 
economic theory and empirical 
methods. Additionally, there 
should be increased emphasis on 
the scrutiny and questioning of the 
basic assumptions made. 
However, it falls short on two 
crucial aspects: the suggestion 
that economics cannot be a 
scientific discipline and the driving 
recommendation of the report for a 
move towards “pluralism” in the 
discipline. This essay will focus on 
these two issues and argue that 
they are fundamentally misguided. 
 
The Status of Economics 
as a Science 
 
 Almost in passing, the 
PCES report boldly states 
“Economics cannot be a science in 
the normal sense of the word” 
(PCES, 27). However, it is never 
made clear what exactly a science 
“in the normal sense of the word” 
is. Ignoring the vague wording, this 
claim is justified by the observation 
that economics deals with people. 
In particular, this implies three 
truths that prevent economics from 
ever being scientific (PCES, 27): 
 
1. Repeated experiments are 
not possible. 
63 
2. The object under study will 
interact with the observer. 
3. Conscious actions — 
whether of policymakers or 
economic agents 
themselves — are 
involved, and these actions 
will affect the action of 
others, making moral 
questions inescapable. 
 
This is the only justification 
provided in the entire report for 
this claim, which is taken as true 
during later analysis. However, 
upon further scrutiny, these three 
observations have little to do with 
whether or not a discipline is 
scientific. We analyze them in turn. 
 
Repeated experiments are 
not possible. 
 
 To begin, it will be useful to 
define two different types of 
experimentation. We will refer to 
experimentation in which the 
scientist himself sets up the 
experiment and records the result 
as active experimentation, e.g. lab 
science. We will refer to 
experimentation in which the 
scientist uses data that has 
already been collected and runs 
statistical tests on it as passive 
experimentation.1 
 Clearly, passive 
experimentation is possible in 
economics. Additionally, such 
experiments can be repeated by 
changing the population and time 
period of interest. Moreover, as 
economic data is constantly 
collected, the opportunity for novel 
experiments arises frequently. 
However, one might argue that 
passive experimentation does not 
constitute actual experimentation. 
Even accepting this narrow 
viewpoint, it is still false to claim 
that economists cannot run 
repeated experiments. 
Experimental and behavioral 
economics, robust subfields of the 
discipline, have done extensive 
work in the laboratory (see Kagel 
& Roth, 1995; Altman, 2006).  
 Further, it is abundantly 
clear that the inability to run 
repeated experiments does not 
preclude a discipline from being 
scientific. Take astrophysics as an 
example. Those studying the 
universe are not able to repeat the 
creation of stars, nebulas and 
galaxies in controlled experiments. 
The discipline makes progress by 
using what observational 
capabilities we have to deduce 
properties of the universe. One 
would be silly to claim that 
astrophysics, championed by the 
likes of Albert Einstein, does not 
constitute a scientific enterprise 
simply because it cannot run 
repeated experiments. 
 
The object under study will 
interact with the observer 
 
 On face, it is difficult to see 
how this does not pervade all of 
the sciences. To run an active 
experiment necessitates that the 
scientist manipulates the object 
under study and the conditions it is 
in, which certainly constitutes a 
meaningful interaction. However, it 
can be plausibly argued that the 
impact a microbiologist has on the 
cells he or she is studying is 
negligible compared to the 
changes in human behavior that 
occur solely in the experimental 
economist’s laboratory. 
 Accepting that problematic 
interaction occurs in every 
discipline to some extent, we can 
place each discipline on a 
spectrum of how troublesome this 
interaction is. Then, the claim 
under consideration becomes the 
argument that economics lies on 
the far end of this scale, with 
severe object-observer interaction 
plaguing the field’s conclusions. 
However, no matter where the 
dismal science lies, it is certain 
that quantum physics lies further 
down the scale. During the birth of 
quantum mechanics in the early 
20th century, physicists performed 
experiments that had results that 
seemed to defy logic (Albert, 
1994). Out of this experience 
came an understanding of the 
measurement problem (Albert 
1994, 79 qtd. in Krips): 
 
The dynamics and the postulate 
of collapse are flatly in 
contradiction with one another ... 
the postulate of collapse seems 
to be r ight about what happens 
when we make measurements, 
and the dynamics seems to be 
bizarrely wrong about what 
happens when we make 
measurements, and yet the 
dynamics seems to 
be right about what happens 
whenever we aren't making 
measurements. 
 
The reason for such a 
contradiction, as the collapse 
postulate implies, is that the act of 
measuring a quantum systems 
alters the state of that system in 
an unpredictable manner. Clearly, 
this problem is much worse than 
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that experienced in economics, yet 
surely one would not claim that 
quantum physics isn’t a scientific 
enterprise. 
 
Conscious actions … are 
involved … making moral 
questions inescapable. 
 
 It is fairly obvious that 
moral questions are involved in 
economics. What is less obvious is 
why this implies that it is non-
scientific. Ethical questions are 
present in almost every scientific 
discipline. Most students entering 
into the world of professional 
science are required to take some 
sort of ethics module because of 
this. However, it certainly can be 
argued that moral questions 
appear more often in economics. 
 That being said, it would be 
silly to claim that these questions 
are most prevalent in economics. 
Bioethics, a subfield of Ethical 
Theory, arose solely to study and 
answer the inescapable moral 
questions of biology and medical 
science. Those disciplines don’t 
cease to be scientific because of 
this; rather, they incorporate moral 
insights into their work in order to 
ensure ethical behavior. In a 
similar fashion, there is a 
substantial amount of literature in 
the philosophy of economics 
attempting to fulfill a similar role 
(see Hausman 2007). 
 
The Feasibility of 
Pluralism 
 
 Now that we have 
established that it is possible for 
economics to be a scientific 
discipline, we will define 
economics as a science of human 
behavior in the economic domain 
(Coyle 2014).2 Given this 
framework, we can now analyze 
the PCES call for “pluralism” in 
economics. In general, this 
suggestion is that economics 
should be an eclectic discipline, 
utilizing several approaches to 
attempt to understand economic 
behavior. This contrasts with the 
status quo, in which the field is 
dominated by “neoclassical 
economics” defined (again, quite 
vaguely) by the PCES as “an 
approach where individual agents 
seek to optimize their preferences 
under exogenously imposed 
constraints” (PCES 14). While the 
idea of pluralism is not developed 
fully in the PCES report, it is 
divided into three separate 
components in an open letter titled 
“An international student call for 
pluralism in economics” from the 
International Student Initiative for 
Pluralism in Economics (ISIPE): 
theoretical, methodological and 
interdisciplinary.3 We address 
these in reverse order. 
 
Interdisciplinary 
 
 Interdisciplinary pluralism 
simply requires that an economics 
education “should include 
interdisciplinary approaches and 
allow students to engage with 
other social sciences and the 
humanities” (ISIPE Open Letter). 
Interdisciplinary work is 
undoubtedly important, and has 
proven to be useful throughout all 
of the sciences. However, 
interdisciplinary work requires that 
cohesive disciplines exist to be 
synthesized; academia without 
disciplinary structure would be 
incredibly difficult to navigate. 
Thus, this type of pluralism is both 
entirely consistent with economics 
as a unified science and entirely 
necessary. 
 
Methodological 
 
 Methodological pluralism 
requires both a broadening of the 
methodology used by economists 
as well as a more critical attitude 
towards the use of quantitative 
methods. The latter suggestion is 
undoubtedly a good idea; it is quite 
silly to continue to use a particular 
methodological approach without 
questioning and understanding 
why it is a good approach to use. 
And often times undergraduate 
economics courses neglect this 
healthy criticism in a race to cover 
as much theory as possible. 
However, this questioning is still 
consistent with neoclassical 
economics dominating the field. 
 The former suggestion is 
also probably a wise idea. In 
particular, the use of qualitative 
methods to include cultural and 
institutional differences in 
economic analyses, as suggested 
in the ISIPE letter, would certainly 
improve policy prescriptions. That 
being said, it is unclear why this is 
at odds with neoclassical 
economics and further, why the 
ISIPE considers this a change.  
 One of the fundamental 
problems with the pluralist 
movement is that it mistakenly 
identifies macroeconomic theory 
as the whole of economic theory. 
After all, the PCES was formed in 
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light of macroeconomic troubles in 
the rich world; no corresponding 
society was formed in the 
aftermath of the International 
Monetary Fund’s (IMF) 
mishandling of several 
international debt crises in the 
developing world.4 There are 
already robust regional economic 
analyses, within the neoclassical 
framework, which utilize more 
qualitative methods to understand 
economic phenomena. Take, for 
example, the work of MIT 
economist Daron Acemoglu on the 
importance of institutions for 
economic growth (Acemoglu & 
Robinson 2012). Further, as Diane 
Coyle notes, there is no mention of 
the recent success in applied 
microeconomics (Coyle 2014). 
These considerations make clear 
that neoclassical economics, 
broadly construed, largely meets 
the requirements of 
methodological pluralism. 
 
Theoretical 
 
  Theoretical pluralism 
requires a broadening of “the 
range of schools of thought 
represented in the curricula” 
(ISIPE Open Letter). In addition to 
the neoclassical economic theory 
currently taught, the letter 
suggests that alternative theories 
such as “classical, post-
Keynesian, institutional, 
ecological, feminist, Marxist and 
Austrian” economic theory should 
be included (ISIPE Open Letter). 
However, this suggestion only 
serves to undermine the 
proponents of theoretical 
pluralism. Much of the 
argumentation in the PCES report 
and ISIPE open letter criticizes the 
economics community for 
suppressing meaningful debate 
and failing to consider alternative, 
heterodox viewpoints. 
 However, as Diane Coyle 
points out, the identification of 
pluralism with heterodox economic 
theories is misguided (Coyle 
2014): 
 
The [PCES] report also 
mistakenly equates pluralism 
with the specif ic views of 
heterodox economics, rather 
than the open-minded 
wil lingness to analyse economic 
issues from a range of 
alternative perspectives 
(including heterodox ones). 
 
Open debate is one of the keys to 
scientific progress, but this debate 
must take place amongst peers 
who largely abide by the same 
theoretical commitments to be 
fruitful. For example, debate within 
the macrobiology community over 
the details of evolutionary theory is 
quite useful, while argument 
between a “mainstream” biologist 
and a creation scientist does not 
lead to a better understanding of 
the natural world. 
 This is an area where the 
ISIPE is clearly mistaken; they 
claim that “other disciplines 
embrace diversity and teach 
competing theories even when 
they are mutually incompatible” 
(ISIPE Open Letter). However, for 
scientific disciplines, this claim is 
markedly false. Any self-
respecting biology department 
would never teach creation 
science as a competing theory to 
evolution. This is because 
biologists all accept the theoretical 
underpinnings of evolution and 
have reason (namely carbon 
dating) to not hold creation 
science as a competing theory. 
However, this same condition 
holds for many forms of heterodox 
economics. Take classical 
economic theory, for example. 
 This was the dominant 
paradigm of economic thought 
before it was replaced by 
Keynesian economics in the 
1930’s and 1940’s. The main 
reason for this transition was that 
Classical theory had no way of 
explaining the massive 
unemployment that characterized 
the Great Depression. When 
asked for advice on how to 
alleviate the ailing economy, 
leading theorists suggested that 
perhaps if people were better 
educated in economic theory, they 
would be able to behave in a way 
that prevented such situations. In 
the midst of this, Keynes writes his 
General Theory, which provides a 
more universal account of 
economic activity, including both 
classical theory as a special case 
as well as an explanation of 
periods with elevated 
unemployment. And thus the 
paradigm shift to Keynesian 
economics was under way. 
 Further, theoretical 
pluralism has dreadful 
ramifications for economic policy. 
Imagine a Council of Economic 
Advisors containing a handful of 
economists that prescribe to 
neoclassical theory while the other 
few are Austrians.5 Fiscal policy 
would be quite hard to coordinate, 
given the complete disagreement 
within the Council on the decision 
to take action, let alone what type 
66 
of action. For instance, following 
the most recent recession, which 
started in 2008, the US 
government authorized the 
purchase of troubled assets and 
enacted fiscal stimuli, most likely 
at the recommendation of 
neoclassical economists. 
However, to an Austrian 
economist, such policies represent 
exactly what not to do, as they 
actually exacerbate the severity of 
a recession.6 
 On the other hand, 
perhaps a truly dedicated Council 
could manage to come to an 
agreement on such matters. 
Regardless, it is certainly worth 
considering what kind of 
disagreement would occur in our 
fictional Council. Clearly, simply 
communicating certain ideas 
would be difficult as scientific 
discussion is usually steeped in 
jargon. Additionally, this jargon 
1 This is admittedly not a complete nor 
rigorous categorization; however, it 
will be useful to refer to and adequate 
for the purposes of this essay. 
2 Admittedly, the positive claim that 
economics is a science does not 
follow from a refutation of the negative 
claim that economics cannot be 
scientific. However, as it is almost 
impossible to continue without a 
working definition, we will continue 
with this general description of 
economics. 
3 We stray from the PCES report here 
only because the concept of pluralism 
is better defined in the ISIPE open 
letter; however, this analysis still holds 
as a general response to the 
argumentation spelled out in the 
PCES report. 
4 In fact, the response from within the 
professional economic community 
was successful in reshaping the IMF’s 
would be not be shared since all 
parties study economics. 
Argument over the details of 
Newtonian mechanics is void of 
words like “spin” and 
“superposition” which are key 
concepts in Quantum Mechanics, 
even though both paradigms aim 
to explain the same physical 
phenomena. The situation would 
undoubtedly be similar in the case 
of differing economic paradigms. 
 And even if this language 
barrier could be hurdled, the 
resulting discussion would amount 
to no more than a series of claims 
with no way of weighting them. 
Since different economic 
paradigms, by definition, make 
differing fundamental 
assumptions, theoretical 
arguments for Austrian policy 
would make little sense to a 
neoclassical economist, as they 
disagree over first principles.7 In a 
research agenda and approach to 
acting as a lender of last resort. 
5 Clearly, the situation would get more 
hectic with more theoretical 
commitments; we analyze the case of 
only two conflicting paradigms. 
6 See Rothbard’s America’s Great 
Depression for an exposition on 
Austrian policy recommendations in 
response to a recession. 
7 This is what Thomas Kuhn refers to 
as the “incommensurability of 
paradigms.” (Kuhn The Scientific 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions) 
8 Considered the first Western theory 
of physics, teleology espoused 
(among other claims) that physical 
objects themselves wanted to return 
to their natural state. Thus, by 
repeatedly throwing a rock and 
watching it fall to the earth, one could 
find many empirical “confirmations” of 
teleology. 
similar manner, different 
paradigms have differing empirical 
methodologies, implying differing 
standards as to what constitutes 
evidence. Thus, in the same way 
that no amount of empirical 
confirmations of teleology would 
convince a particle physicist that 
Aristotle was right, empirical 
evidence gathered by a 
neoclassical economist would 
probably carry little weight in the 
Council’s discussion.8 
 
 It is important to note that 
even in light of these 
shortcomings, there is a real need 
for reform in field of economics, 
and the PCES report highlights a 
couple of excellent suggestions for 
reform. However, it is vital that 
these reforms only move us in the 
right direction.  
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